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Abstract. The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) defines the specifica-
tions for the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and corresponding trust
mechanisms that allow a TPM-enabled platform to run only authen-
ticated software. For example, the operating system (OS) can use the
facilities provided by the TPM to authenticate a Digital Rights Man-
agement (DRM) application before allowing it to run. However TCG
does not provide any clear specification on what kind of software can
be regarded as trusted and hence be authenticated. In fact it is unlikely
to draw a clear line between the software that should be authenticated
and those should not. For instance, it may be controversial to autho-
rize debugger for developing binary codes and/or Internet browser for
running applets on TPM platform. This leaves a grey area where even
authenticated software may be exploited for malicious usage.
This paper investigates the security of DRM applications in a reasonably
relaxed scenario where users have larger purview. It presents two attacks:
abuse attack and injection attack where some reasonably authenticated
software can be exploited for stealing protected contents. In the abuse
attack, an attacker uses an authenticated debugger to monitor the inter-
nal state of a DRM application for the purpose of violating the access
privilege in the application. In the injection attack, an adversary is able
to make malicious modifications on an original DRM application at will.
These two attacks demonstrate that it is not straightforward to impose
DRM in a TPM-enabled system. To counter the attacks, we provide the
OS-encapsulation scheme which encrypts the DRM application such that
only the genuine OS can start the DRM application. Our scheme can be
viewed as an enhancement of security for TPM-enabled DRM in a loose
but more practical environment, where people are still allowed to use the
debugger, web browser, etc.
1 Introduction
General-purpose computer platforms provide the convenience for developing and
running software applications. However, it also allows a malicious user to tamper
with and possibly control any software component at will. Software tampering
not only affects the software industry in general, it can also impede content deliv-
ery services and compromise enterprise systems. Hence, many software vendors
employ software protection technologies to counter such threats. Unfortunately,
it has been generally accepted in the information security research community
that software alone cannot provide an adequate foundation for building a high-
assurance trusted application [1]. Hardware-assisted protection [2] is a promising
solution for strong software security.
In the past decade, cryptographic hardware modules have played such trusted-
bootstrap role on behalf of secure wireless hand-holds for governmental users or
military software defined radios or on behalf of bank cash dispensers or on behalf
of bank card payment terminals. For instance, ARM (http://www.arm.com) re-
leased Trustzoner as its solution for trusted platforms, and many mobile plat-
forms nowadays (mobile phones, bank card payment terminals) are hardware
platforms that run an OS over ARM-embedded micro-controllers.
To bring the security feature of handhold device to general purpose platforms
such as personal computers, the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [3] defines the
specification for a security chip called the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and
its related software interfaces. In the TCG specification, the TPM is designed to
provide end-user machines with a minimal but essential hardware base for end-
user side security. For instance, there are TPM-enabled schemes in enhancing the
security of smartcard [4], attestation [5–7], and privacy protection [8–10]. Since
it is impossible to modify the TPM-enabled OS without being detected, the
TPM can be employed to defeat sophisticated attacks such as the substitution
attack [11, 12] which invalidates software integrity protections (e.g., [13, 14]).
In addition, Felten [15] highlights the possibility that a DRM application can
utilize the TPM to protect data such that only cooperating applications are able
to consume the protected content.
Although the TPM can potentially be used in many applications, its pro-
tection mechanism is still not satisfactory [15–18]. For instance, Anderson [16]
criticized TPM-based DRM applications as treating users in an unfriendly way.
Additionally, in a DRM application, a traitor4 may misuse a genuine software
to compromise the built-in access control in the application.
1.1 Our contribution
TPM platform restricts the access right of virus, applications and users, hence
it provides some valuable security functions. However, we need to consider the
loose scenarios where users are given reasonably more authority. In practice, it
is hardly acceptable to employ a very restrictive confine on software usage, e.g.,
disabling loaders including software debugger and/or network browser.
This paper investigates the security of the TPM-based DRM where some
reasonably authenticated software such as debugger can be used, and proposes
4 A traitor is a user who modifies his authorizations illegally. For example, the traitor
may change his read permission into write permission
the abuse attack and the injection attack. In the abuse attack, a malicious user
makes use of a trusted application such as a debugger to mediate the interactions
between the victim program and the OS. On the other hand, given that a user is
allowed to sign and certify his own program on the TPM-enabled platform, the
injection attack enables him to run any program locally at his discretion. Both
attacks allow the malicious user to violate the content protection objective of
DRM. To counter these attacks, it is necessary to verify the owner/signer of the
application, and to establish the application’s authenticity. To achieve this, we
propose to encrypt the DRM application and start the decrypted application by
the authenticated operating system only, thus prevent both abuse attacks and
injection attacks. By the two attacks and their countermeasures, we demonstrate
that TPM does not guarantee DRM security automatically and easily. Many
issues have to be solved before we can claim that the trusted computing based
DRM has better security.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the
TPM. Section 3 introduces the model of TPM-enabled DRM. Section 4 describes
a basic TPM-enabled DRM scheme, followed by two attacks on the scheme.
Section 5 proposes our techniques to the TPM-enabled DRM scheme to counter
the attacks. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Overview of TPM
TCG is an industry working group which aims to establish industry standards
for trust and security in computing platforms. It was founded in 1999 by HP,
IBM, Intel and Microsoft, and there are now close to 150 member companies.
The TCG’s TPM is one example of hardware chip that aims at providing the
root of trust of a platform. It is especially applicable to platforms that would
otherwise not have any hardware security module. In the TCG specification
for TPM, a TPM chip provides on-chip key pair generation using a hardware
random number generator, as well as RSA cryptographic functions. The TPM
communicates with the system CPU on a non-system bus, and acts only under
the control of the system CPU and the policies codified in the OS and TPM-
enabled software applications.
2.1 TPM component
To provide the trusted computing platform (TCP) with root of trust, protected
storage, key generation and attestation, a TPM module includes: (1) processor,
(2) hardware Random Number Generator (RNG), (3) cryptographic engine, (4)
non-volatile memory, (5) real-time clock, (6) tamper control circuitry, and (7)
non-volatile storage space.
The TPM processor controls the functions and sequencing of the entire TPM
module. It moves data between the system processor and the internal TPMmem-
ory, sequences the cryptographic engine, and helps oﬄoad the RSA computation
from the general purpose system processor.
The RNG is the source of seed numbers for the cryptographic engine’s en-
cryption and decryption functions, and for the generation of RSA key pairs. It
also provides random values for generating signatures.
Secure storage stores sensitive data such as the permanent Endorsement Key
(EK) and Storage Root Key (SRK). EK is bound to a unique platform by the
manufacturer, while SRK is tied to the TPM owner who takes ownership of the
TPM. All other cryptographic keys are protected by the SRK. An Attestation
Identity Key (AIK), generated by TPM, is a special key used for generating
digital signatures. Each TPM can have as many AIKs as it needs for the sake of
anonymity.
The real-time clock provides tamper-proof date stamping for authentication
and attestation processes. By monitoring the voltage, clock frequency and other
environment parameters with tamper control circuits, the TPM can effectively
prevent illegal access to sensitive information, such as by tampering the TPM
with a low voltage supply.
2.2 Transitive trust
In the trusted platform, the initialization and management functions in the TPM
allow the owner to turn its functionality on and off, reset the chip, and take
ownership of the chip. This group of functions provides strong separation of what
can be done at BIOS boot time and what can be done at normal run-time, so that
sensitive operations such as reading the endorsement key cannot be performed by
malicious applications trying to compromise the TPM. Concretely, the trusted
boot functions compute hashes of configuration information throughout the boot
sequence, and store the hashes in Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). If
a TPM-enabled computer is reset, all the PCRs are reset too. But at any other
time, the PCRs can only be extended. When a TPM-enabled system is started,
a secure booting sequence will be performed as shown in Fig.1. The execution
units consists of the Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM), the Master
Boot Record (MBR), boot sector, boot code, boot manager, the OS loader, and
the OS. Each unit in the process will have its integrity measured before execution
control is handed over to it. If any of the integrity measurements is invalid, all
the subsequent units will not run. Only if all the units are intact, the application
will be verified and executed.
3 Model of TPM-enabled DRM
In the paper, we focus on the security of TPM-enabled DRM applications on
the general computer other than the dedicated DRM device since the latter is
lack of extensibility, flexibility and inter-operability.
3.1 DRM Architecture
The underlying motivation for having DRM applications is that digital objects
should remain under the control of their creators, rather than the owner of the
OS loader code
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Fig. 1. Transitive trust applied to system boot from a static root of trust[19]. Trusted
Building Blocks (TBB) are the parts of the Roots of Trust that do not have shielded
locations or protected capabilities. Normally these include just the instructions for the
Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM) and TPM initialization functions (e.g. reset).
platform containing the objects. One major threat to DRM is the tampering
of the DRM application and its platform since a traitor can modify them so
as to circumvent the DRM protection. Currently, a lot of commercial DRM
systems (e.g., such as Microsoft Windows RMS, and Adobe Web Buy) and stan-
dards (e.g., [20–22]) are available. Fig. 2 illustrates their architectures which are
as follows.
– An author generates digital content such as video file.
– A DRM-enabled application will create a rights-protected version of the file
and assign usage rights at the content server. A portal server provides a Web
site so that the consumer can preview, purchase and download content that
interests him.
– A license server will be responsible for the enrollment and certification of
trusted entities, and for licensing right-protected content.
– Finally, the consumer’s DRM client software interacts with the DRM server,
and renders the content according to the consumer’s assigned privileges. The
consumer may distribute the content to others without violating the digital
right.
Although the general DRM architecture and workflow are applicable, the
security depends on the assumption of a trusted environment. In lieu of a fully
trusted environment, a TPM-enabled DRM application can be used to provide
trust to the content owner. The model for such an application is described in
the next subsection.
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Fig. 2. General DRM architecture.
3.2 Security model
Although TCG specifications describe the technology on how to authenticate a
software, it has never been explicitly described, or even discussed, what kind of
software should be allowed to be authenticated. For the practical application of
TCP, there is a big gap on how and who will be responsible for the software
verification and validation. Indeed, it is not going to be an easy issue. From the
application viewpoint, it is unfriendly to exclude all the common used software
tools (e.g., debugger and Internet browser), and may result in potential market
lose. To balance between right-restriction and user-friendliness, we consider a
not very restrictive situation of TCP, and argue that the assumption of such a
situation is very reasonable and practical.
In the system diagram Fig. 3, TPM and OS constitute the trusted platform
which is compliant with the TCG specification, and supports a trust transitive
process, as mentioned in Section 2. A genuine software application P is signed
by its producer (or a trusted third party) who has a certificate issued by a CA.
The CA’s public key is trusted by the OS. To authenticate P, the OS will verify
its signature before running it. Note that the OS does not use TPM integrity
measurements on P, but the OS itself will have its integrity verified by way of
TPM integrity measurements as mentioned in Section 2.2. The DRM Software
P must be loaded by a trusted OS or a trusted debugger. According to the DRM
requirements, we assume that any user has the following capabilities,
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Fig. 3. System diagram. P is the target DRM software, and Q wraps P. Q will be
loaded by a malicious loader such as a compromised debugger.
A1: able to load the targeted program P in the trusted platform with his own
loader. For example, an authenticated Internet browser is able to run a
applet P which is a DRM application for rendering protected data stream.
Similarly, a debugger such as Microsoft Visual Studio can be used in
TPM environment.
A2: able to intercept/modify the messages between P and the OS by using
a malicious loader. For example, a TPM application developer should be
able to debug his own software related to TPM functions. In other words, a
malicious user can always “sit” between OS and DRM application so as to
monitor P.
A3: able to insert his own root certificate into the OS. By doing this, any user
is able to develop and sign any software including modified application and
run it on the platform.
A4: unable to have the power/resource to reverse-engineer the target software
P to gain knowledge of critical algorithms or secrets such as a cryptographic
key. Otherwise, the attacker can write his own software with the reverse-
engineered code and then render the protected content.
In a general computer platform, a user owns the platform and all software
running on the platform including P. It is acceptable that a trusted general
computer has some but not all limitations on the users. We argue that it is
reasonable to assume user’s capabilities A1−A3 for the following reasons:
– Although it is controversial about the function of TPM, a TPM-enabled
computer must have an open structure in terms of software and hardware,
otherwise, why does a user buy expensive computer other than cheap TV
setbox?
– A TPM-enabled OS prevents a user from running an “unapproved” appli-
cation, but it is unacceptable to deprive the user the right of developing his
own software. Hence, the platform shall allow the user to load applications
that are approved by themselves.
– As argued in [17] in terms of protecting fair use rights, users should become
the root of their own certification trees and authorize various devices to view
purchased content.
– It is not uncommon in commodity platforms that a user is able to install
his own root certificates. For example, in browser applications such as the
Microsoft Internet Explorer, a user can import his own root certificates
into the existing set of trusted root certificates.
A4 is mandatory although it is believed to be impossible in theory. Fortu-
nately, the software designer can increase the hacker’s cost with the technologies
(e.g., diversity, anti-tracing, anti-disassembling, self-modifying code, and code-
encryption) such that the hacker gives up the hacking goal. We can also enhance
the security of software if the application code is encrypted all the time except
the execution period on TPM platform.
In summary, the security model disables to start virus-infected softwares,
but enables user to develop his own software, runs debugger and browser for any
application but DRM application. Meanwhile, the DRM application can be only
started by the designated loader such as Microsoft explorer. Hence, this model
can enforce DRM policy without reducing user’s reasonable right.
4 Basic TPM-enabled DRM: Scheme & Attack
Following the model in Section 3.1, this section introduces a basic TPM-enabled
DRM idea derived from [15]. Then it presents two attacks on the basic scheme
such that a traitor can obtain unauthorized access.
4.1 Basic TPM-enabled DRM Scheme
Although a TPM-enabled platform provides a trusted environment with PCR
reports to detect “unapproved” software, its application to DRM is not straight-
forward if security and inter-operability are important. For example, Felten [15]
described the TPM-enabled software inter-operation principle which can be ap-
plied to design a basic TPM-enabled DRM as follows.
– The digital file is encrypted with an authorized DRM program P such that
the digital content is under the full control of P.
– If another program Q wants to consume the file, the only way is to request
P to decrypt it in a TPM-enabled environment and transfer the decrypted
content, but P maybe reject the request.
– The protected media will be decrypted on a TPM-enabled platform and used
in a controllable way.
Therefore, P must be tamper-proof and authentic before executing if A2
and A4 are true. As a result, the traitor can not violate the DRM access by
tampering with the software. However, basic TPM-based DRM is vulnerable to
the following abuse attack and the injection attack.
4.2 Abuse Attack
With the assumption of trustworthy hardware and software, the TPM-enabled
platform ensures that each application is valid when it runs. That is, no untrusted
software can execute on the platform. However, the traitor can combine two or
more approved programs in a certain way to realize his malicious intent. In
particular, if an authorized software can load and execute some other program,
as in the case of a typical debugging tool (e.g., Microsoft Visual Studio,
SoftICETM and IDAproTM), the traitor can use it to access protected content
as follows.
– Start the debugger. Since the debugger is genuine and is signed by the pro-
ducer, it can be started successfully.
– Load application P with the debugger. A1 allows for this.
– Execute P within the debugging environment. Since the debugger has higher
execution priority than P, the traitor is able to read all the data in the
address space of P, including the decrypted content.
Therefore, the traitor has easily compromised the TPM-enabled DRM protec-
tion by executing the targeted application within a debugger. Presently, Internet
browser such as Internet Explorer or Firefox is able to run web-based applet,
it can be misused to launch abuse attack too.
4.3 Injection Attack
According to assumption A3, any user can insert his certificate as a root certifi-
cate into the OS. This means that any software signed by the traitor can pass
the verification process described in Subsection 2.2. In this case, the traitor can
initiate the injection attack to compromise the content protection mechanism of
the platform. Concretely, the traitor will
(1) Install his certificate as a root certificate in the OS. A3 allows for this.
(2) Modify program P by injecting functions into P or injecting entries in P’s
function import tables, resulting in a malicious wrapper Q. For example, the
traitor can replace or modify the action module of menu-item “save”, such
that it dumps all the decrypted content to memory.
(3) Sign Q with the private key corresponding to the newly installed certificate.
(4) Run Q as an authorized program. Since P is wrapped by Q, P is started
implicitly. Now, since P is able to decrypt the protected content, the wrapper
Q will be able to read the decrypted content.
(5) Invoke the injected function to dump the protected content to disk. The
traitor can do this by activating the tainted menu-item “save” for example.
In the above injection attack, the traitor wraps an authorized software P and
produces a new program Q. This attack does not require the traitor to know
the internal structure of P. He only needs to tamper with the code partially to
have the decrypted content dumped to disk.
In addition, if a user can not install his certificate, but can initiate abuse at-
tack, he can integrate the above two attacks so as to violate the DRM efficiently,
in other words, he can create the modified software Q and then run Q in the
debugger or browser environment.
4.4 A na¨ıve countermeasure
Since the basic scheme is vulnerable to the attacks addressed in Subsections 4.2
and 4.3, the security strength of DRM application should be enhanced.
A straightforward enhancement is based on PKI. Specifically, all the TPMs
have different private keys (e.g., EK) but the same public key. Any DRM soft-
ware should be encrypted with the public key such that the protected code can
be decrypted by the trusted platform only. Its weakness is that it will incur
inconvenience in case of TPM upgrading.
5 OS-oriented Encapsulation Scheme
The present OS-oriented encapsulation scheme defines a new format of applica-
tions. It uses the architecture mentioned in Section 3 since the architecture is
employed in many DRM commercial systems, but encapsulates the DRM ap-
plication with the new format so as to match A1−A4 in Section 3 for sufficient
flexibility and security.
5.1 Scheme description
In the proposed scheme, we intend to meeting three objectives: (1) DRM ap-
plication can be loaded by the designated OS loader only; (2) allow the honest
user to develop his software; (3) able to defeat injection attack and abuse attack
from malicious users. To this end, the scheme includes 4 modules: configuration,
encapsulation, installation and DRM enforcement. Concretely,
Configuration A Certificate Authorities (CAs) issues digital certificates to OS
vendors and DRM vendors. Each OS vendor, for example Microsoft, has a pair
of (public key e, private key d) for each of its OS products. The OS vendor signs
the OS with its authenticated public key.
Encapsulation After a provider develops its DRM application, it will encrypt
the application with the public key of the public key of destination OS. In order
to guarantee the installation, each module (e.g., dynamic link library) will be
encrypted independently. Suppose that P includes l modules mi, i = 1, 2, . . . and
will be run in an operating system whose public key is e. The provider will select
the software key k, and produce
C = enceP = {Enc1e(k), Enc2k(m1), · · · , Enc2k(ml)}. (1)
where Enc1(·) is an asymmetric encryption function, while Enc2(·) is a sym-
metric encryption function respectively. Afterwards, the providers signs the en-
crypted own DRM application C, and sends the ciphertext and the signature to
the user. If P can run a multiple of operating systems, the DRM vendor encrypts
the software key k in Eq.(1) with each public key of the OS.
Installation The installation process targets for setting up a trusted OS and
DRM application in a TPM-enabled environment. Fig.4 illustrates the steps of
installation. Specifically,
– when the OS is being installed, the installation software (such as BIOS hard-
code) will initiate remote attestation with the vendor server V. This means
that the installation software will use the TPM remote attestation facilities
to remotely authenticate to V. (This is similar to OS activation over the
Internet, which is currently required by Microsoft Windows XP).
– V securely sends the private key d of the OS to the TPM. This private key
d shall be protected by the TPM and stored in sealed storage.
– After obtaining the OS package locally or remotely, the TPM-enabled plat-
form must verify its authenticity with the digital certificate of the OS vendor.
Only if the OS package is authentic, OS and other OS-related modules can
be installed as usual.
– To install a DRM application P, TPM system will obtain the ciphertext
C = Ence(P), make sure that C is produced by the application provider,
and install C directly without decryption.
DRM enforcement When the DRM application is being executed, a desig-
nated loader such as explorer.exe in Windows OS package will send a key
request to the TPM. TPM verifies the integrity of the OS and the loader, and
then decrypts the secret key d to explorer.exe. With d, the loader decrypts the
encrypted application C into memory so as to obtain the memory mapping of
P. Then, P will be executed normally, e.g., read the content and enforce DRM
protection.
5.2 Security Analysis
When all the modules of P are intact, the DRM application can be loaded into
process memory for the DRM enforcement. Since the DRM code is encrypted in
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Fig. 4. Installation process. TPM is equipped with some BIOS-like hard codes for
attestation when it is manufactured. The dash line for OS downloading means that OS
can be obtained via other channels such as CD-ROM.
hard disk, a hacker can not statically reverse-engineer P so as to start injection
attack directly. However, the hacker may attempt to break the DRM protection
in the following ways.
– Recording the decrypted content via the output device. For example, voice
recording or screen dumping. Fortunately, the quality of the pirated content
is of low quality and result in less threat to the content industry, thus this
kind of violation is out of our scope.
– Extracting the secret key of OS. In the installation stage, the OS provider will
testify the authenticity of the TPM based on the manufacture information.
As long as the TPM hardware is secure, the OS private key will be kept
secret.
Additionally, to reduce the risk associated with d being disclosed in mem-
ory, we can further split d as d = d1 ⊕ d2 with secret sharing. The share
d1 is embedded into the OS directly with some software tamper-resistance
technology [23–27], and the other share d2 is downloaded from the vendor
during the installation stage. When the DRM application is launched, the
OS will obtain d2 from the TPM to reconstruct d. With this improvement,
in the unlikely event of a hacker breaking the TPM and retrieving d2, he is
unable to recover d directly, thus limiting the damage.
– Dumping the DRM code from memory. When a DRM application is loaded
by an authorized loader, the DRM application will be stored in memory.
A malicious user may attempt to dump the code for reverse-engineeering.
This attack can be easily defeated when the OS insulates the process address
space.
– Forging decryption request. In the enforcement stage, only the designed pro-
cess can send the key request to decrypt the protected application, otherwise,
the malicious user can get the decrypted code with a debugger. To this end,
the OS must verify the PCR of the loader such that only authorized loader
can load all including os-encapsulated applications (e.g., DRM application),
but other loader such as debugger or browser can load non-authorized ap-
plications.
Since the application provider encrypts the DRM application, and only the en-
crypted application is stored in the non-protected storage such as hard disk.
Therefore, the malicious user can not get the clear application code and can not
start misuse attack. Therefore, neither can the traitor tamper/reverse-engineer
the DRM application code, nor can he use a malicious debugger to load the code.
6 Conclusion
Since a TPM-enabled platform can prevent a user from running an “unapproved”
application, it is possible to develop a tamper-resistant TPM-enabled DRM ap-
plication, as suggested in [4, 17]. But it is not trivial to achieve that. We have
presented two attacks on the basic TPM-enabled DRM: the abuse attack and the
injection attack. The abuse attack misuses an “approved” loader (e.g., debugger
or browser) to run the DRM application, while the injection attack tampers with
the genuine DRM application and re-signs the tampered version so that it can
run as an “approved” application on the platform. Both attacks enables a traitor
to gain unauthorized access to protected DRM content.
In order to counter these attacks, the present OS-encapsulation scheme makes
sure that an encrypted DRM application is only loaded and decrypted by an
authenticated OS, thus defeating the abuse attack, as well as the injection attack.
This encapsulation format stops running virus-infected softwares, enables user
to develop his own software, run debugger and browser but it still can enforce
DRM protection.
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